ABSTRACT With the increase in tourism, the size of domestic and foreign travel destinations has also begun to increase. However, this growth is accompanied by the homogenization of each scenic spot, which results in the convergence of destination image and declining competitiveness. To address this problem, this paper is based on the dynamic competition relationship between homogeneous folk tourism destinations studied using the evolutionary game theory of homogenous competition environment, and the dynamic relationship between the destinations is examined through research and analysis. This paper studies whether the tourist destination can take the model of tourists in the case of this homogenization and analyzes the countermeasures that should be taken. This paper provides reference for improving the destination revenue and efficient visitor management. We hope to further clarify the essence of the competitive relationship between the tourism destinations and to make the tourist destination more competitive. At the present, product homogenization is ubiquitous. Homogeneous area is related to the development of the differences of the same area tourism scenic area, as the development intensity is increasing; because of the common cultural background, resources and environment are somewhat shared in the production of large numbers of similar tourist destinations, and homogeneity is inevitable. Therefore, the potential negative impact of the brand tends to place the scenic spot in an awkward position. Tourism must satisfy the psychological needs of tourists to seek something new and different. Difference development must begin from regional overall planning to such factors as the similar resources type, characteristic, formation, structure, and distribution. By careful and detailed investigation, examining the scenic spot's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges enables the evaluation of the system. We observe the breakthrough of ''scientific development, resource complementation, mutual dependence, and common development'' of homogenization of a tourist destination. Construction connotation differences from a tourist orientation leads to more comprehensive enjoyment of the high homogeneity of the scenic area and makes use of similar resources in tourist destinations due to changes in the environment and function of innovation of tourists' recognition.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of tourism, the competition between tourist destinations is becoming increasingly fierce. In this context, the homogeneous tourist destination which attracts tourists can have a competitive advantage. The resources that the tourist relies on are easy to copy, especially as the current tourist development resources in the homogeneity problem are more and more serious. This effect has caused the homogeneity of the destination image convergence resources which, in turn, has led to the decrease of the destination competitiveness, as potential customers are attracted by numerous similar destinations. Therefore, under image convergence conditions and in the case of image convergence, finding a destination and implementing a strategy of attracting tourists, with the construction in accordance with its own interest strategy method and developing tourist destination competitiveness, has become the key point in the development of the scenic spot.
The difference in tourist products can be attributed to matter difference and cognitive difference, and the matter difference can be divided into transverse and longitudinal differences. For the longitudinal difference, tourist destination of tourism products, projects, facilities, catering and other related industries, the grade of the difference is not high, quality always is low, and tourist destination is a heavily commercial phenomenon, as the shops are numerous and sell the same goods, and the hotel restaurants serve the same dishes.
The ''homogenization'' tourist destination has become a way for tourists to adjust their lifestyle, and it has lost the ability of tourist attraction. In terms of horizontal differences, homogenization tourist destination products are of a single type. The existing homogenization tourism destinations almost lack the interactive experience between tourists and scenic spots, and lack understanding of perception and culture. In terms of cognitive differences, many old towns did not highlight their brands. Because certain destinations themselves having a high visibility, the tourist destinations blindly imitate other tourist destinations, leading to a blending of style, and it is difficult to see the cognitive differences of the different brands.
At present, there is little research examining the homogeneity of tourist destination competition. The research is based on the destination as a more perfectly rational situation on both sides, and from the angle of the static simulation research, which lacks the dynamic process of the real situation. In reality, the competition between the two parties is continuous and repeated, and the right state cannot be reached through competition. It is not possible to have sufficient information before the competition, and it will be restricted by objective conditions. It can only be bounded rationality. Therefore, this paper targeted starting from the actual situation of homogeneity tourist destination bounded rationality, using evolutionary game method to study the dynamic evolution process of the homogeneous tourist destination, and analyzed the evolution results.
II. IPTS OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
Game theory is proposed by John von Neumann to explain how two sides decide the best strategy in a competitive game. A game involves many players, with each facing a strategic choice. Games can be games or repetition. How players play this game is a gamers' strategy. The rules of the game determine the return to each strategy of the player. These rules and the corresponding returns can be expressed by a decision tree in a Payoff Matrix. Classical game theory essentially requires each party to make rational choices. (That is, according to the result of evaluation, the overall rational strategy is selected.) The result is that each party must analyze the opponent's strategy and decide whether his strategy is reasonable or not.
The difference between evolutionary game theory and classical game theory is that evolutionary game theory pays more attention to the dynamic characteristics of strategy change, that is, it not only considers the influence of various competitive strategies, and considers the effect of the frequency of competitive strategies in groups. Maynard Smith realized that in evolutionary game theory, every player does not have to act rationally. They just need to have a strategy. The results of the game will test whether the strategy is good or bad, which is what evolution means: evolution can test the survival and replication of different strategies in the environment. In biology, an individual's game strategy is essentially a characteristic of genetic determinations, and strategies are determined by algorithms, as in computer programs. This approach is the key point in the evolution game theory: a successful strategy is not only determined by the policy strategy that is good or bad, but it is how well among a set of optional strategies, as well as other strategies in a competitive group frequency. Also, this approach can be useful, because in the biological world, a successful strategy will ultimately become the dominant strategy of the whole group, and the individual will have to face the others in the group who use the same strategy.
Using evolutionary game theory to analyze research problems, the two important concepts that need to be defined are the ''evolutionary stability strategy'' and ''reproduction dynamics.'' The basic idea of evolutionary stability strategy is: assuming that a group of behavioral patterns can be eliminated by small mutants, the pattern of behavior is bounded to benefit more than the mutant group. As evolution occurs over time, these mutant groups will eventually disappear from the original group, and the chosen strategy of the original group is the strategy of evolutionary stability. The replication dynamic is a dynamical different equation that is used by a certain strategy in population. By the principle of evolution, if a strategy is more adaptive than the population means it to be, this strategy will evolve in the population.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF THE EVOLUTION GAME MODEL OF THE HOMOGENIZATION TOURIST DESTINATION
The establishment of evolutionary game model is mainly based on two aspects: Selection and Mutation. The choice between these two strategies lies within the question of which will benefit more and will be adopted by more participants in the future; the mutation is that some individuals in a random way choose different strategies from the group (which may be a strategy that can achieve either a higher yield than the group or a strategy with a lower yield). Mutations are also a choice, but only good strategies can survive. Mutation is a continuous process of trial and error, and a process of learning and imitation; this process is adaptive and continuously improves. The evolutionary game model has several characteristics: First, the participating group is the research object, and the dynamic evolution process is analyzed to explain why the group reached and how to achieve the current state; second, the evolution of group has both a selection process and a mutation process. Third, the behavior of group selection has certain inertia.
In the evolutionary game model, the limited rational tourist destination repeats the game under certain rules to see if it can. To achieve the equilibrium condition, suppose there are many different rules of conduct for a tourist destination. Travel destinations that adopt certain rules of behavior benefit more than those that do not. Over time, the travel destinations that adopt these rules of behavior will survive; travel destinations that do not use these rules will be eliminated. The two homogeneous tourist destination models have both selection and mutation, which form the ultimate evolutionary game model.
The game environment of the homogenization tourism destination is complex. In order to be suitable for analysis, the following assumptions are made:
(1) There are only two sides in the game: tourist destination A and B, both of which are bounded rationally. (2) Behavioral strategy: travel destination A and B will adopt different strategies based on their own profits. The study simulates a tourist destination for tourists. (3) 1 − X Behavioral strategy adoption probability: During the competition of tourist destination A and B let us assume the probability that A gets A visitor is: X , the probability of not getting it is: the probability that B gets to the tourist is Y , the probability of not getting a visitor is 1 − Y . According to the above assumptions, tourist destination A earns revenue from tourists by:
Tourist destination A has no income from tourists:
The profit of A mixed strategy in the travel destination A is:
According to the principle of evolutionary game theory, if the strategy is higher than the average of the whole, this strategy will evolve, which indicates that the growth rate of individuals using this strategy in the population is greater than zero. Therefore, according to formula (1) and formula (3), the dynamic equation of replication of the strategy of destination A can be obtained:
The dynamic replication equation for travel destination B is:
On the basis of formula (4) and formula (5), a constituted dynamic replication system:
IV. EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGY OF A DYNAMIC GAME OF TOURIST DESTINATION
The dynamic equation of the replicator can ensure that the evolutionary stability strategy eventually produces equilibrium, but it is stable in the general dynamic equation. The strategy is neither a sufficient condition for evolutionary equilibrium nor a necessary condition for evolutionary equilibrium. Evolutionary game theory is increasingly useful. The most comprehensive equilibrium concept is the evolutionary stabilization strategy, which finally achieves equilibrium. Because the behavior of the tourist destination is changing all the time, it is reasonable to assume that there is a change. The subject of the tourism destination constantly improves its behavior and simulation during the evolution process. Successful strategies require a relatively long time. Time is irreversible, and the state of the past and the future is not right. Therefore, the evolution of the subject state is closely related to the initial state of time. In evolutionary game model, random (mutation) factors play a key role, and the evolution process is regarded as a process of trial and error, and the actor will try various behavioral strategies. Slightly, and every time there will be a partial substitution.
A. ANALYSIS OF TOURIST DESTINATION OF A DYNAMIC GAME
The F(X ) = dX dt , derivative F(X) of X:
Evolutionary stability analysis of different parameters:
, for all X points are stable points, tourist destination obtains the visitors at constant strategy choice, with A constant.
(
dX | X =1 < 0, because the stable point is X = 1, the probability of tourist destination B adapts the visitors greater than a certain value, the rational A will choose a strategy of tourists. When Y <
dX | X =1 > 0, so X = 0 is the stable point. The probability of tourist destination B adapting the visitors is greater than a certain value; A may choose not to get a visitor's strategy.
2. When
The F(X)=0, get X = 0, X = 1, but
dX | X =1 > 0, X=0 is the stationary point. Both A and B choose a strategy of tourists; both sides of the income are greater than the one which chooses the strategy of tourists. When both sides are not for tourists, one side of the profits are greater than the two sides at the same time, getting the user benefit. At this point, A tourist destination strategy chooses not to attract the other tourists.
3. When
dX | X =1 > 0 so X = 0 is the stable point; when both sides attract tourists, both sides of the income are less than either acquisition strategy, A chooses not to get A strategy.
dX | X =1 < 0, that X = 1 is the stable point, when both sides get tourists, both sides of the income are less than either acquisition strategy; A chosen for strategy.
B. THE EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY ANALYSIS OF TOURIST DESTINATION B
The evolutionary strategy analysis of tourist destination B:
Let F(Y ) = dY dt , take the derivative to F(X ) we can get:
, X is a stable point, B is stable and chooses the evolutionary strategy; A does not change the strategy used;
is a stable point; A uses a strategy, which has the higher probability than other numbers, and then B chooses the access strategy; when X <
dY | Y =1 > 0; therefore, Y = 0 is a stable point; A uses a strategy which has lower probability than other numbers, and then B doesn't use access strategy. 
when
In this analysis, when an access probability somewhere is higher than another stable point, another part chooses the access strategy; when an access probability is somewhere lower than another stable point, other parts do not choose the access strategy.
C. DYNAMIC GAME OF TOURIST DESTINATION FOR EVOLUTIONARY STABILIZATION STRATEGY
Using equation (9) to describe the policy dynamic change between tourist destinations, we can get five stable point (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1),
The stability of the stable point is obtained from analyzing the Jacobian matrix. Therefore, we can get the Jacobian matrix, as shown at the bottom of this page, from equation (9) . Stable points stand for the (ESS) between two choosing strategies, and need to satisfy det(J ) > 0 and tr(J ) < 0 and tr(J ) < 0, some points that are beginning to stabilize. However, all these stable points are not evolutionary stability strategies. According to the Jacobian matrix, we need to analyze these five points. The conclusion of det (J ) and tr(J ) is shown as chart2 and chart3. Like
We can use schematic diagrams to describe the dynamic condition of the system, to see the picture 1 (each picture meets the demand of 0
. In the process of strategy competition, there is a stable equilibrium point. At the equilibrium point, the competition of these strategies reaches a certain equilibrium state.
when m 4 + c − m 3 > 0, m 1 − m 2 c > 0, if both sides choose to obtain strategy income greater than one side gains income, both sides choose the same strategy of obtaining or not obtaining. The relatively stable strategy reaches the most basic equilibrium conditions at this time. The whole dynamic system is close to the state of equilibrium. Both sides will rationally choose better strategies. when m 4 +c−m 3 > 0, m 1 −m 2 c > 0, if both sides choose to obtain strategy income less than one side gains income, both sides choose not to obtain the strategy. The strategy is for both sides to reach the most basic equilibrium. The dynamic competition is close to the state of balance. The two sides will rationally choose the optimal strategy. when m 4 +c−m 3 > 0, m 1 −m 2 c > 0, if both sides choose to obtain strategy income greater than one side gains income, both sides choose to obtain the strategy. The strategies of both sides reach the most basic equilibrium. The dynamic competition is close to the state of balance. This time produced an optimal strategy. when m 4 +c−m 3 > 0, m 1 −m 2 c > 0, if both sides choose to obtain strategy income less than one side gains income, both sides choose the contrary strategy. The relatively stable strategy reaches the most basic equilibrium conditions at this time. The whole dynamic system is close to the state of equilibrium. The two sides will rationally choose the optimal strategy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Tourism has become one of the fastest-growing industries in China. However, most of the scenic spots are facing similar problems with similar sites, similar cultures and similar resources. The competition among destinations is also more intense. In particular, the competition for scrambling tourists is getting more intense. Although the tourist destination managers attach great importance to the construction of a scenic spot image, the strong dependence of destination tourist resources brings the resource homogenous destination into the predicament of image convergence difficulties. It is difficult for tourists to rely solely on publicity for effective areas of the destination. In the case of resource homogenization, tourists still differ in their destination personality. The image of convergence is not necessarily bad, it just depends on how the destination is managed. Therefore, each destination needs to take corresponding acquisition strategies to compete with other homogenization destinations.
Therefore, the focus of tourism destinations should be highlighted to avoid the phenomenon of homogeneity. From the point of view of tourists, the influence of the homogeneity of tourist destinations is mainly to reduce the space for tourists to choose the destination. According to the principle of economics, when the selection space of a product is limited, the choice of visitors will decrease generally. Therefore, the homogenization of tourist destinations will not meet the changing and growing demand of tourists. Moreover, the lack of high-quality tourist destinations will affect the potential tourist demand of a large number of tourists. From the perspective of the tourism industry, the homogenization of tourist destinations is an important factor leading to fierce competition among scenic spots. In the condition of high product homogeneity and the gradual loss of competitiveness between the scenic spot, visitors could not judge the difference between tourist destinations. It would be blind to follow suit, leading to tourist destination trips that will appear suddenly jumped, or encounter cold in two extreme cases. The results of the influence of the tourism destination is great, and it caused the waste of resources, which limits the development of the regional economy.
Homogeneity in the context of tourist destination development should be of accurate positioning, forming self-style history culture is the connotation of tourism destinations, and the scenic spot historical origin is different. A tourist destination should take advantage of the scenic area with scenic spot internal resources in order to conduct a comprehensive combination, to form a unique style, to build step by step, to open related tourism projects and to stay after the completion of the overall construction. We then introduced a new image, so as not to cause the hardware to have to keep up with the situation of the software. In the development process, it should be integrated with the modernization of agriculture, services, industry and other industries, and formed with local characteristics of industrial clusters. This characteristic tourist destination is difficult to copy by other scenic spots and to go beyond it in a short period of time is difficult. Second, we should dig deeper to reveal the historical culture of scenic spots, deeply excavating the cultural background of a tourist destination and the value behind it, highlighting their own cultural connotation from the scenic spot and passing it on to the tourists. To increase the activity of some more participatory activities and to enhance the activity of tourists, the reconstruction of the historic buildings and historic sites cannot be used as a single development choice. Finally, the relevant competent departments should improve the evaluation mechanism for projects within a certain geographical area; the part of the homogenization plan shall not be adopted. At present, relevant competent authorities have received the report of tourism project planning, which will not analyze their tourism, entertainment content and market competition advantages. Tourism projects are almost always the same as the tourist investors' themselves. Most tourism projects, due to small investment, are easy to cause homogenization competition.
In this research, a variety of situations are assumed; when the strategy is adopted for one party's destination, the other destination will adopt corresponding coping strategies in a timely manner. In this paper, an evolutionary game model is used to simulate the comprehensive strategy of tourist destination. This paper also analyzes the countermeasures that homogenization tourist destinations should take when faced with many competitors. We hope that the future research for the tourist destination of strategic decisions can play a guiding role and can provide the research foundation for the application of evolutionary game theory in the tourism industry. 
